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ENVISIONING POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Nancy J. King1 & Joseph L. Hoffmann2
This lecture poses the following question: What would
happen if we radically rethought our approach to post-conviction
review? Our present system of post-conviction review has
outlived its utility. New empirical research reveals that the
system wastes scarce resources and produces very little tangible
benefit. Drawing on several discrete ideas that others have
advanced before, and adding a few new ones, we can begin to
sketch out a new model for post-conviction review tailored to the
needs and circumstances of criminal justice today.'
I. THE PROBLEM
The present system of review for state criminal judgments
has been in place since about the mid-1960s or so. It involves
multiple, often duplicative stages: (1) a direct appeal, which can
include multiple proceedings in several different courts that are
all considering the same questions; (2) state post-conviction
I Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Professor King delivered this 2008
Otis Lecture in April 2008 based on ideas she and Professor Hoffmann worked out
together. The first person-"r"'-thus refers to Professor King, and "we" indicates both
authors.
2 Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington.
3 This lecture presents our initial outline of a preliminary idea that is developed
and significantly changed in a later article, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, forthcoming in 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2009).
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proceedings, where again, the same questions may be considered
several times by several different courts; and (3) federal habeas
corpus review, where constitutional questions are raised in the
district court, then in the federal court of appeals, and often in
yet another certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
This system was created to cope with a revolution in the
regulation of the criminal process-the incorporation of the
protections in the Bill of Rights against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In 1950
relatively few state prisoners would have been able to seek relief
in federal court because the Due Process Clause had been
interpreted to protect against only those actions by states that
infringed fundamental fairness; many of the criminal procedure
protections enjoyed by federal defendants had been denied to
state defendants.4 Then, in a series of cases decided over twenty
years, the Court simultaneously expanded both the reach of
federal law and its enforcement in federal court. By the mid
1970s, the Court had extended to state prisoners dozens of new
constitutional claims5 and a wide-open invitation to raise them
before federal judges.6 To fend off federal interference and
provide their own review, states responded by creating post-
conviction mechanisms of their own that a prisoner must
navigate before heading to federal court.7
Why rethink this system now? Because it has outgrown its
usefulness. Rights have continued to expand, while prison
populations and average terms served' have grown even faster.9
4 See generally 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL, NANCY KING & ORIN KERR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (3d ed. 2007); see also id. at § 2.6(b) n.34 (collecting cases in
which the Court extended a criminal procedure guarantee to state defendants in the
1960s and overruled precedent from the 1930s and '40s).
5 Id.
6 For a discussion of the expansion of habeas corpus review from "jurisdictional"
error to constitutional violations, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 4, at § 28.3(b).
7 See 1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 2:5 (2007-08) (noting the expansion of criminal procedure
rights and habeas review "put pressure on and also encouraged the states to upgrade the
quality of their postconviction relief machinery").
8 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
511 tbl.6.44 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds., 2003) (finding that, excluding life
sentences, the average time served jumped seven months for first releases from state
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We think that the cost of this multi-layered review system has
far surpassed its benefits, at least in all but the relatively small
number of cases that involve the death penalty. The
Constitution would be better served by abandoning the effort to
prop up the complex remedial system that state and federal
courts are struggling to provide long after conviction and
shifting those resources into indigent criminal defense earlier in
the process.
A. Wasted Effort on the Backend
This country has the highest imprisonment rate in the
world.1 Among the many consequences of this dubious
distinction is the record number of petitions that prisoners file
each year in federal and state court seeking relief from
convictions and sentences. This litigation consumes an
enormous amount of taxpayer dollars.1"
In 1996, Congress passed a law-the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") 12-in an effort to
streamline federal habeas review of state criminal judgments
and reduce post-conviction litigation costs in federal courts.1 3
prison between 1990 and 1999, and the percentage of sentence served increased from
thirty-eight to forty-nine percent); PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 7-9
(1999).
9 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 8, tbl.6.29.2006 (showing that
nationwide, the number of state prisoners per 100,000 population doubled from 130 in
1980 to 272 in 1990, then nearly doubled again to 445 by 2006); id. tbl.6.28.2006.
10 International Centre for Prison Studies, Prison Brief for United States of America,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/ (follow "North America"
hyperlink; then follow "United States of America" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 17, 2008)
(noting that the United States has an imprisonment rate of 7,621 per 100,000
population).
11 Both state and federal courts have seen an increase in post-conviction filings. See,
e.g., Growing Number of Inmates Turning to Post-Conviction Relief, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10,
2006 (the number of cases growing 46 percent over the past four years); source cited
infra note 14.
12 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
13 E.g., Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) ('The scant legislative
history discussing the purpose of AEDPA's habeas restrictions indicates that Congress
was concerned with delay and finality').
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Last fall, together with researchers at the National Center for
State Courts and with funding from the Department of Justice, I
completed the first empirical study of habeas litigation after
AEDPA.' 4 The study examined separate samples of capital and
non-capital state prisoner filings in habeas, but the focus here is
on the non-capital cases. Over 18,000 federal habeas cases are
filed each year by state prisoners. 5 The sample examined in the
study was a random sample of all non-capital habeas cases filed
by state prisoners nationwide.16 We found that not only are
these cases taking a long time to process-longer than before
AEDPA 7-- but also that the vast majority of the time, energy,
and money spent on federal habeas is wasted. Federal habeas is
essentially a futile exercise for state prisoners serving non-
capital sentences.
In the first place, federal review is essentially out of reach
to most prisoners. Only those with particularly long sentences
have meaningful access. The study showed that state prisoners
take on average at least five years to reach federal court.1 " This
rules out access to habeas review for most people convicted of
felonies in state court, sixty percent of whom don't go to prison
14 NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 26 (2007),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf (hereinafter HABEAS STUDY).
15 FRED L. CHEESMAN, I ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A TALE OF Two LAWS
REVISITED: INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND
THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (2004),
http://www.ncsonline.org/WC/Publications/Res-PreCivTwoLawsRevPub.pdf; JAMES C.
DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 90-94 tbl.B- lA, 145-47 tbl.C-2,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/contents.html.
16 HABEAS STUDY, supra note 14, at 15-16.
17 Id. at 56, 59 (median processing time for completed cases increased from 6 to 7.1
months; taking into account cases still pending, average processing time was over a
year). For pre-AEDPA statistics, see ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (1995), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf; Victor
E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court
Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 327 (1995).
18 HABEAS STUDY, supra notes 14, 55-56 (noting the average filing period is 5.1 years
excluding cases challenging administrative decisions and excluding cases found to be
time barred; average filing period for all cases was over six years). This actually is
longer after AEDPA's statute of limitations than it was before. Id.
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at all.19 The median sentence of those that do receive prison
time is less than three years,20 so most state prisoners are no
longer incarcerated by the time they are in a position to file a
federal petition. Not surprisingly, the study found that only
twelve percent of noncapital habeas were filed by prisoners with
a sentence of five years or less, 21 while nearly thirty percent
were filed by prisoners serving life sentences, even though lifers
make up fewer than two percent of people in prison.22 In short,
for most of those who enter state prisons, the Great Writ is
inaccessible.
Secondly, even those that do reach federal habeas court
don't get relief. Federal judges deny or dismiss almost every
petition that is filed. In our sample, only seven petitioners (out
of nearly 2,400) received any sort of relief (and at least one of
these has already been overturned on appeal).23 That is a one
third of one percent chance the prisoner will succeed in getting
an order to be retried, resentenced, or else released. These cases
represent a substantial drain on the limited resources of the
American criminal justice system for almost no return. Another
important cost, albeit an indirect one, is the likelihood that
meritorious claims of error will get lost or overlooked in the
constant barrage of meritless claims.
B. Missed Opportunities at the Front End
Not only do we spend far too much on futile, successive
post-conviction proceedings, but we spend these scarce resources
in the wrong place. The cost of post-conviction review squanders
state and federal criminal justice dollars, instead of spending
them where they are needed most. Forty years after the Court
announced the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings in
19 MATTHEW DUROSE & PATRICK LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (2007),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf.
20 Id.
21 HABEAS STUDY, supra note 14, at 20.
22 Id. at 20, 54; DUROSE & LANGAN, supra note 19.
23 HABEAS STUDY, supra note 14, at 52.
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Gideon v. Wainwright,24 and nearly twenty-five years after the
Court outlined the test a prisoner must meet in order to receive
relief for errors of his counsel in Strickland v. Washington,25
inadequate indigent defense remains the most pressing
challenge affecting constitutional rights in criminal justice
today. Lack of training and experience, heavy caseloads, low
pay, and little funding for investigation continue to plague
defense services in state criminal cases.2"
Because defense lawyers must preserve issues for review,
the crisis in indigent defense at the trial and appellate levels is
directly related to the wastefulness of post-conviction
proceedings. The mistakes of counsel show up as procedural
defaults-forfeitures of claims that were never raised when and
where they should have been. Post-conviction litigation too
often focuses on these forfeitures and whether they should be
excused instead of on the merits of constitutional claims.
Twenty-five years of enforcing Strickland has not improved
the situation. At one time, some may have hoped that it would
have. In practice, however, relief under Strickland remains
essentially hypothetical in non-capital cases. It is available only
if the defendant (1) does not waive through his plea the right to
raise a Strickland claim in post-conviction review,27 (2) is
sentenced long enough to reach a post-conviction stage where a
record can be made, 2 (3) can show that his lawyer's action was
24 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
25 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise/fullreport.pdf; Bryan
A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 342-45 (2006) ("States are
unable to fund adequate indigent defense systems or provide sufficient resources for
oversight, training, and management of cases.").
27 See Douglas A. Morris, Waiving an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim: An
Ethical Conundrum, 27 CHAMPION 34 (2003) (noting the increasing use of such waivers
by federal prosecutors, and arguing that defendants should require the advice of
independent counsel in order to make them).
28 The complaints about the futility of ineffectiveness litigation are not new.
Professor Eve Brensike Primus argued last year in the Cornell Law review that
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not strategic, and, hardest of all, (4) can show a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had the error never
happened.29 And because even winning a Strickland claim
carries no consequence for those providing representation, its
deterrent power is practically nil.3"
Anyone involved in the criminal justice system for very long
will have a story to tell about oversights of defense attorneys at
the trial or appellate level that Strickland could not correct.
One particularly egregious example is described by Professor
Jon Gould, Chair of the Innocence Commission for Virginia, in
his new book The Innocence Commission.31 The case involved a
lawyer who both failed to cross-examine the detective who
presented the defendant's confession and failed to check whether
his client's blood, semen, and prints matched what the police
had found during the investigation. 32  The defendant was
convicted of rape, and he later alleged in post-conviction
proceedings that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Strickland proved utterly useless. The federal courts
reviewing his case found that because of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, including his confession, the defendant could
not demonstrate adequate "prejudice" from his attorney's
incompetence, which is the showing required for relief under
Strickland.33 Years later, the defendant was exonerated by
DNA tests, and even won a civil judgment against the detective
ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") claims are out of reach for most defendants so
long as they are relegated to state post-conviction proceedings years after conviction.
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007).
29 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
30 For commentary on the anemic regulatory effect of Strickland litigation, at least
in non-capital cases, see Primus, supra note 27, at 688-97.
31 JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 79-83 (2008).
32 Id. at 170. In another case, a defendant was convicted of rape even though he
testified at trial that he had had a vasectomy and thus could not have been the source of
the sperm found in the victim. The medical records proving the defendant's vasectomy
prior to the rape were never obtained by defense counsel, and the defendant remained
imprisoned for ten years until DNA, and those medical records, exonerated him. Id. at
169-70.
33 Id. at 81.
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who had pressured him to confess to a crime he never
committed.
The statistics from the recent study of habeas cases confirm
what a waste of resources Strickland claims presently entail, at
least for non-capital prisoners seeking relief in federal court.
Although half of the non-capital cases in the study raised a
claim of ineffective assistance, 34 in only one case out of nearly
2,400 was relief granted, and that grant was later overturned on
appeal.35 Nearly twenty percent of the non-capital cases filed
involved a procedurally defaulted claim, 6 but in none did a
federal court grant relief after concluding that a procedural
default should be forgiven because of the denial of effective
counsel. 3
7
II. RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM
A. Doomed Strategies for Repair
Many maintain that the problems with futility at the post-
conviction stage can be traced to the restrictions on access to
post-conviction relief and the refusal to provide lawyers after
direct appeal. They argue, in other words, that relief is rare not
because there are so few meritorious claims but because so
many meritorious claims are never raised or, if raised, never
remedied.38 Put differently, the rare habeas grant is not a
needle in a haystack; it is the tip of an iceberg.
Some who share this view believe the solution is obvious:
add lawyers to post-conviction phases;3 9 repeal the restrictions
34 HABEAS STUDY, supra note 14, at 28.
35 Id. at 52, 116.
36 Id. at 48. The failure of prisoners to secure adequate legal advice also contributes
to the remarkably high proportion of federal petitions by non-capital prisoners that are
dismissed as time barred-more than one in every five petitions. Id. at 46.
37 Id. at 115-16.
38 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 25; Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal
Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (2006); Roger
Berkowitz, Error-Centricity, Habeas Corpus and The Rule of Law as The Law of Rulings,
64 LA. L. REV. 477 (2004).
39 Stevenson, supra note 25, at 358.
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in AEDPA;4 ° beef up the Strickland test so that it is easier to
meet;4' and, as one professor recently proposed, overrule Stone
v. Powell and consider Fourth Amendment claims on habeas.42
We believe that this is exactly the wrong response. Without
speedier access to these phases of post-conviction review,
making these phases more defendant-friendly would benefit only
those sentenced to the longest sentences. Moreover, the extra
strain these reforms would place on state resources would make
review even more unobtainable for everyone else. Even for the
small portion of inmates who actually receive post-conviction
review, a lawyer is useless without better representation at the
trial level to preserve objections to error. Lawyers at the back
end can do very little to remedy claims of error which have been
defaulted back at trial or on appeal.
B. A New Way: The Trade-Off
We propose a very different approach to thinking about the
future of post-conviction review. In our view, the starting point
must be the recognition that the two problems discussed above-
the wasteful efforts after direct appeal and the continued
deficiencies in the provision of adequate counsel before and
during appeal-are joined at the hip. Changes in one can and
should be linked to changes in the other. What is needed is a
solution that would allow the states to shift dollars that they
now waste at the back end forward to trial and appeal at the
front end, where those resources can make the kind of
meaningful difference for the accused that Strickland and post-
conviction review never could. Even if federal habeas cannot be
repaired as a reliable means of error correction for most
prisoners, if recast it can serve a useful role as a political and
economic incentive to encourage the states to provide a reliable
means of error prevention.
Implementing this idea would probably require Congress to
40 Id. at 358-59.
41 Yackle, supra note 37, at 567.
42 See Steve Semeraro, Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal
Habeas Corpus, 34 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 49 (2007)
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amend the habeas statute to provide a quid pro quo.43 If a state
takes specified steps to effectively reform its system of defense
representation at the trial and appellate level, then federal
habeas review could be scaled back drastically from what it is
today, and federal funds would be made available to assist in
maintaining adequate defense representation. Conversely, if a
state fails to implement front-end reforms, existing habeas
review could be expanded (for example, by returning to the.
"deliberate bypass" standard for procedural default),44 and
federal funds-say for additional custodial corrections
expenditures-could be withheld.
As Professor James Liebman once wrote about capital
cases: "[T]he logical cure for an error-prone system that
chronically cycles products from a shoddy fabrication process to
a long, expensive inspection process and back again is to devote
more resources to the fabrication process in hopes that quality
control eventually will require fewer resources. '45 We think it's
best to pay now, and try to fix the problem at the front end,
rather than waste our societal resources on inefficient and
ineffective litigation at the back end.
That's the big picture. The details of such a reform
proposal, of course, will be crucial to its success or failure.
Although we have yet to work out these details, we can offer
some preliminary thoughts about how some of them might look.
1. The State's Duty
In order to qualify for a new, leaner form of federal habeas
review, Congress could require a state to meet clearly defined,
federal standards for ensuring that
0 all defendants, including indigent defendants, are
provided quality defense representation;
43 See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 944 (1998) ('CThe point at which additional review is no longer
producing a sufficient net increase in accuracy to justify its cost and delay is a policy
question, and policy questions belong to Congress.").
44 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 4, at § 28.4.
45 James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315,
326 (2002).
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* all exculpatory evidence that is material is made
available to defense counsel before trial or the entry
of a guilty plea (e.g., by implementing police and
prosecutorial "open file" policies);46 and
* all post-trial claims of new evidence of factual
innocence receive meaningful review, are
investigated where necessary, and are referred to
the state courts for remedial action where
appropriate. This could be achieved through either
(1) an open-ended opportunity for convicted
defendants to present new evidence of factual
innocence in state post-conviction proceedings or (2)
an opportunity for review by an "innocence
commission"47 with the authority and resources to
review and investigate claims of factual innocence
made by convicted defendants and to refer cases
involving such claims of factual innocence to the
state courts for remedial action where appropriate. 48
Under this radically shifted system, case-by-case
adjudication about the trial, plea, or appellate performance of
individual attorneys in non-capital cases would end. Neither
46 E.g., GOULD, supra note 30, at 190-93 (recommending open-file discovery as a
response to wrongful convictions).
47 One model might be the Innocence Inquiry Commission recently established in
North Carolina. Patterned after the review of claims of innocence in the United
Kingdom, the commission's members are appointed by the Chief Judge and must include
a judge, prosecutor, victim advocate, defense attorney, sheriff, and member of the public,
plus two other members. Claims of innocence would be screened by Commission staff
and require new evidence not previously considered. The defendant must waive all
privileges and agree to cooperate. The commission has independent investigative
authority, including subpoena power. If the Commission finds there is sufficient
evidence to merit judicial review, the case is referred to a three judge panel that, in turn,
has the power to dismiss charges or find the defendant has not proven innocence.
Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1354-60 (2007).
48 We also assume that states will continue to provide some judicial review of claims
of illegal custody that do not question the validity of conviction or sentence: parole and
goodtime violations, claims of sentence miscalculation, unconstitutional or illegal civil
commitment under mental health or sexual predator laws, unlawful confinement prior to
trial, etc. But these questions are handled in most states, we think appropriately, under
procedures that are separate from those authorized for prisoners who file state post-
conviction petitions challenging convictions and sentences.
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state nor federal courts would consider claims of ineffective
assistance. Instead, enforcement of federal standards could take
several forms, so long as it occurs state-wide, and is not litigated
on a case-by-case basis. For example, a state agency could
regulate the certification and appointment of counsel in criminal
cases in its state, following a number of standards promulgated
by Congress. Or a federal agency could take on more of the
oversight functions. Either way, ensuring ongoing state
compliance could be part of federal agency oversight, with
recourse to courts, to determine whether Congress's mandates
have been carried out.4 9
This approach could do more to improve defense
representation at the trial and appellate levels than Strickland
ever could because effective representation would be ensured not
by the unrealistic threat of post-conviction relief, but pervasively
and systematically, without regard to the individual guilt of
particular defendants, and impervious to waiver during
negotiations.5 °
We do not presume to offer a definitive list of the
requirements for the provision of adequate defense
representation. Rather, Congress could draw upon the excellent
and extensive research that already has been conducted in this
area to craft individual standards or could charge a federal
agency to do so. Some of the many ideas already proposed by
49 The idea of prophylactic measures to prevent violations rather than case-by-case
litigation over whether reversal is warranted as a remedy also has a storied history.
Prior to Strickland scholars and courts argued that "preventative measures" such as
improved training offered the primary route to achieving competent attorney
performance. In an earlier time, the Court, fed up with case-by-case post-conviction
review of custodial interrogations, substituted Miranda warnings and waivers. And few
critics today bemoan the inability to overcome in post-conviction proceedings, the
presumption of intelligence and voluntariness of each and every guilty plea that attaches
upon compliance with certain prophylactic rules and standards that apply before the
plea is accepted. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
50 Nancy J. King, Regulating Settlement: What Is Left Of The Rule Of Law In The
Criminal Process? 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 389, 399 (2007) (arguing that "revisions in the
resources allocated to public defenders' offices-changes that are not subject to waiver by
the parties-may have a greater impact than tinkering with the postconviction rules
governing ineffective assistance claims.").
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the ABA, adopted by some states, or both include the following: 51
(1) a statewide mechanism for oversight, such as a state agency,
independent of the state judiciary and not dependent upon
county funding, with the mission, legal authority, and adequate
resources provided by the state to oversee the provision of high-
quality defense representation in that state; (2) minimum
qualifications for defense counsel; (3) a process for the initial
certification and recertification of defense counsel; (4) caseload
limits;52 (5) peer review of the counsel performance;53 and (6)
data collection of all complaints, peer reviews, and case results
for individual attorneys5 4 that the oversight body could review
51 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 4, at § 1.4 nn.113-126 (collecting sources). See also
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/181160.pdf; THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON




52 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS
MANAGEABLE (2001), http://www.ncjs.gov/pdffilesfbja/185632.pdf.
53 See, e.g., THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
supra note 50 (collecting performance standards). Our proposal would require each state
to set up a system of meaningful peer review that would apply to both appointed and
retained defense counsel. Without trying to prejudge the most appropriate specific
features of such a system in every jurisdiction, we would anticipate a system that relies
on a statewide Peer Review Committee composed of highly competent, deeply committed
defense lawyers (e.g., the best of the state's public defenders). This committee would be
given the primary responsibility to oversee defense counsel performance throughout the
state. The committee would set and apply the standards of education, training, and
experience for certification of defense lawyers, and would also ensure the integrity of the
state's process for appointing defense counsel for indigent defendants.
54 This empirical evidence could include information about the outcomes of trials and
plea proceedings involving each defense lawyer and complaints filed by defendants
against their defense lawyers. With the help of such a database, the overseers would be
in a position to look for patterns of substandard outcomes and defendant complaints that
would tend to show that a particular defense lawyer perhaps should be investigated.
Prior initiatives to collect data about the performance of criminal defense attorneys has
tended to focus on aggregate data, which can be used to analyze systemic problems with
defense representation systems, but which would be of limited use in assessing
individual performance. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE
STUDIES, http://www.spangenberggroup.com/work-indig.html; Letter from David J.
Carroll, Director to the Michigan Supreme Court,
http://www.sado.org/publicdefense/carroll_2005-09-27.pdf (proposing expanded data
collection on performance of Michigan criminal defense attorneys).
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as part of the recertification process.55
2. What's in It for the States: The Trade-Off
There are three potential sources of funding for this
improved system of assuring that the constitutional rights of
those accused of crime are honored. The first two sources are
resources currently devoted to post-conviction litigation.56
Institutionalizing competent counsel in the trial court and on
direct appeal, open-file discovery, and innocence review will
largely dispense with the need to maintain the kind of complex
post-conviction apparatus that we currently have. It should be
possible to shift significant resources from the '%ack end" of the
criminal justice system to the "front end," where those resources
can do more good. This shift could occur in three separate ways:
First, states that provide reliable and robust defense
representation at the trial and direct appeal for every criminal
defendant could decide to eliminate post-conviction review of
criminal judgments in the state courts entirely, except for
55 De-certification would not necessarily provide any ground for relief for defendants
who had previously been represented by that lawyer (although a state could choose to
provide a remedy for such defendants). Instead, such defendants would still have to
satisfy, in federal habeas, the same standards as all other defendants, including the
requirement of demonstrating likely innocence. But de-certification would at least
ensure that no future defendants would suffer bad outcomes as a result of that lawyer's
failings.
56 The idea of trading aspects of federal habeas review for better defense
representation earlier is not new to habeas commentary. Professor Daniel Meltzer
raised the possibility at the end of an article criticizing the limitations of habeas review
in 1993. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2507, 2526-27 (1993). Justice Powell's commission recommended over
eighteen years ago that federal review be scaled back in return for better state post-
conviction counsel in death cases, and a version of this opt-in scheme was endorsed by
Congress, but these particular provisions have yet to be implemented. See Liebman,
supra note 44, at 333. Also in death cases, Professor James Leibman recommended in
the Ohio State Law Journal six years ago, for many of the same reasons we outline
today, that in exchange for better counsel at the trial level defendants should waive post-
conviction review. See Liebman, supra note 44, at 337. Unlike these earlier proposals,
the suggestion floated here would have Congress deny federal habeas as we know it to
defendants from states that meet these standards, and give states even more incentive
and capacity to meet these standards by encouraging them to scale back their own state
post-conviction review.
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innocence review.57
Second, in return for providing better representation and
discovery earlier in the process, the states would also enjoy a
drastically cheaper federal habeas litigation bill. Congress could
scale back federal habeas relief in these states. Rather than
litigating, over and over again, thousands of meritless claims
that are unrelated to innocence, states could target their post-
conviction resources to only those cases remaining cognizable:
those with promising claims of innocence of conviction or those
involving retroactive application of a new rule. This change in
the scope of habeas relief would slash the workloads of federal
courts and states attorneys that now respond to habeas
petitions. In many jurisdictions the money spent to provide
post-conviction review (and defend post-conviction cases) may
come from a different pot, so to speak, than funding for indigent
defense. This will pose a political challenge for those advocating
reallocation of these moneys-from the state's budget to a
county or metropolitan budget or vice versa.
A third revenue source may be needed because the cost of
providing adequate counsel to all of those facing felony charges
probably dwarfs, in most states, the present cost of post-
conviction review for those locked up long enough to seek it.
That third source might be federal funds-which would assist
and incentivize states to meet their Sixth Amendment
obligations. Some federal funding could be reclaimed from the
savings from scaling back federal post-conviction review, but we
anticipate additional funds would be required both to set up the
standards system and create enforcement mechanisms. Direct
financial incentives for states that continue to demonstrate
compliance with the higher standards could take many forms,
including matching funds or conditioning related federal funding
(say, for new prison beds, for example) on the provision of
adequate defense statewide.
57 Because federal habeas review of almost all claims will be conditioned on a
showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of factual innocence, there will be no reason
for defense counsel ever to "sandbag," or otherwise deliberately default a claim.
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3. Letting Go of Strickland and Brady
Abandoning case-by-case post-conviction litigation in favor
of prophylactic safeguards would mean that some very tiny
fraction of defendants, who under the present system might
have won the habeas lottery, would lose out. It is true that even
under this tentative scheme, defense representation will never
be perfect, and some clients will indeed pay for attorney errors if
they have no convincing new evidence of innocence. Someone
could spend his life in prison because his lawyer failed to file a
suppression motion, when in another identical case, for example,
where the lawyer did not make such a mistake, the defendant
may go free. This is undoubtedly the most controversial part of
our proposed rethinking of post-conviction relief. Yet if shutting
down case-by-case litigation of such claims will help to provide
better protection for more defendants, it is well worth the trade-
off. The net result should be fewer instances of error overall,
and that's exactly what the federal constitutional regulation of
state criminal justice should produce.
Post-conviction litigation presently works for too few, and
too rarely, to provide deterrence of future violations.
Abandoning these ineffective yet expensive tools would provide
needed funds to furnish better counsel and information for far
more defendants. Instead of the occasional person receiving a
new trial or sentencing after a finding of ineffective assistance
as the only check on state's failure to provide good lawyers, the
new system would regulate counsel at the front end, through
institutional sanctions that do not depend upon a defendant's
ability to show that the errors of his counsel were so bad and the
states' case against him so weak, that he deserves a new trial.
58 Although we believe a radically shifted system would protect the right to counsel
better than Strickland claims do now, states may choose to reap the benefits of reduced
federal review and meet federal indigent defense standards while still preserving a case-
by-case remedy for attorney failings. This would mean fewer freed-up state funds to
provide for trial and appellate defense services. If a state did preserve review of IAC
claims in state court, however, we would recommend implementation of a mechanism for
speedy factual development of non-record claims in a motion for new trial or during
appeal so that the appellate process could provide review of all claims (including IAC)
with an attorney in less time than a subsequent post-conviction proceeding. See Primus,
supra note 27 (recommending a unified appellate process including IAC claims).
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Overall, more defendants should receive better assistance in
more cases.
III. CAPITAL CASES
Although the focus of this presentation is the review of non-
capital cases, the review of capital cases deserves mention. One
of the main problems with current habeas law is that it is built
almost entirely in response to concerns about the post-conviction
review of the small number capital habeas petitions filed in
federal court each year, ignoring the over 18,000 non-capital
filings.5 9 The problems in capital cases are specialized, and the
two types of cases need not be addressed in the same way.
Already many states have entirely different procedures for death
penalty cases, and we believe it makes sense to follow this dual
pattern in proposing any post-conviction reform.6"
IV. CONCLUSION
Encouraging the states to concentrate their scarce criminal
justice resources on improving defense representation, and
freeing them from post-conviction litigation, will simultaneously
address two of the most persistent problems in the criminal
justice system today: the inadequate delivery of defense services,
59 See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 145-47 tbl.C-2,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02SepO7.pdf.
60 At the least, we would suggest that if a similar trade-off is considered for capital
cases, federal habeas review should remain available in more circumstances than we
suggest for non-capital cases. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz,
Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 65 (1994) (arguing for concept of "two-
track" federal habeas). Merits review should be preserved not only to those defendants
who can make a "clear and convincing" showing of factual innocence or to those who are
entitled to the retroactive application of new rules (as in non-capital cases) but also to
those who demonstrate that the aggravating circumstance on which the death sentence
was premised was not adequately proven (i.e., "actual innocence" of the sentence), or that
the death sentence is an unconstitutional penalty in light of the defendant's crime, see,
e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (unconstitutional to impose death
penalty for rape of child when victim is not killed), or status, see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (unconstitutional to impose death penalty for crime committed by
mentally retarded defendant); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (unconstitutional
to execute defendant who is insane).
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and the years and years of wasteful and misdirected litigation
after appeal.
Of course, this represents a kind of compromise, and
compromises tend to make nobody happy and everybody
suspicious. States may argue that federal standards for defense
representation go well beyond existing constitutional mandates
for the right to counsel, that Congress has no business
conditioning federal remedies on state policy choices, or that
money saved by reducing state and federal post-conviction
review could be more wisely spent on something other than
padding the pockets of criminal defense attorneys. Defense
advocates, including many of our own academic colleagues, may
complain that scaling back of already meager post-conviction
remedies for serious violations of constitutional rights,
particularly the right to effective assistance of counsel, will
result in even more constitutional violations and wrongful
convictions. More post-conviction review of the merits of claims,
not less, they may argue, is needed.
We think that both of these positions are shortsighted and
that Congress and state governments together can do a better
job providing the procedures mandated by the Constitution
without bankrupting the states. Whether one's metric is
accuracy or constitutional compliance, any meaningful shift of
resources from the post-conviction review now in place to
defense representation earlier in the process would be an
improvement over what we have today. Certainly the number of
defendants who could use better lawyers before conviction far
exceeds the number of defendants that might be harmed by
eliminating existing post-conviction litigation after appeal,
especially when review is retained for convincing claims of
innocence.
The triple-layered, expensive process of state and federal
review of criminal judgments now in place was constructed
during a historical period when federal judges were at odds with
state judges in criminal cases, when a smaller proportion of our
population was sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and when
DNA testing had yet to reveal how those innocent of crime could
be found guilty. It is time to consider whether the structure
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built upon the outdated assumptions of this earlier era has
outlived its usefulness. We believe that it has, and that post-
conviction policy should take a new direction. The most
formidable barrier to the enforcement of the Constitution is not
the state judiciary; it is inertia.

